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The significance of the Arctic in 
Russia’s foreign policy: why Arctic 
policy issues are of topical interest 
to the Baltic States 
Vytautas Sirijos Gira 
Recently the Arctic Region has appeared increasingly often among Russia’s 
foreign policy objectives in the Russian foreign policy discourse. Competition 
for the Arctic Region among the 5 bordering states – USA, Canada, Denmark, 
Norway and Russia – grew intensive in the late 2008 –2009, as all the states 
(hereinafter – A-5) announced or renewed their national strategies on the 
“absorption” of the Arctic in the short- and mid-term perspective. As the 
competition of the A-5 states for the Arctic gathers momentum, the growing 
global demand for oil and natural gas, which could be satisfied by energy 
resources of this region, as well as other Arctic-related issues make it possible 
to forecast that in the nearest future the Arctic will become one of the most 
significant regions that will be in the focus of attention of the international 
community. 
 
The growing topicality of the Arctic to Russia’s foreign policy makes it necessary 
to review the development plans of the states laying claims to the Arctic and to 
assess the potential influence of Russia’s declared intentions on active 
development of the Arctic on the Baltic States.  Better understanding of the 
Arctic issue would enable timely response of the Baltic States to these changes. 
What consequences to Russia-NATO relations may the foregrounding of the 
Arctic issue  have? How could the EU-Russia collaboration be developed in 
this region?  What interests does Lithuania as well as the other Baltic States 
have in these international processes and why, despite the fact that these states 
are not explicitly involved in the current processes, the latter are still relevant to 
them?  How can the resolution of the Arctic issue affect Lithuania’s security 
situation? 
 
Arctic’s status quo 
The Arctic Region may be defined as the area around the North Pole, including 
the Arctic Ocean and northern borders of the North America and Eurasia (see 
III.1). The greater part of the Arctic Region is made up by the Arctic Ocean and 
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its sea1
 
. The political status quo is essentially formulated by four 
characteristics:  
• To date the Arctic Region is already of strategic importance. The Arctic 
may comprise approximately 13 per cent of undiscovered world oil 
reserves (90 billion barrels of oil) and 30 per cent of natural gas 
reserves (47 trillion cubic meters)2
• The basis for the current state of affairs in the Arctic Region is the 
temporary “agreement not to agree” of the relevant actors. There are at 
least 5 territorial issues in the Arctic Region that are yet to be resolved. 
Due to the lack of a mechanism regulating the region’s issues, to date 
the Arctic issues are found in direct dependency on the bilateral 
relations of the A-5 states. However, the tension in the region will 
remain relatively low until the assumptions of international law have 
come into effect, which would make the beginning of the competition 
for the Arctic possible. 
. Taking into consideration the fact 
that issues of sovereignty and extraction of these resources have not yet 
been unresolved, the Arctic is a potential tension point in international 
relations. 
• Presently neither the EU nor NATO are taking part in the settlement of 
the Arctic issues; however, taking into consideration the importance of 
the Arctic Region and the EU and NATO positions that have already 
been declared, the involvement of these organization may be but a 
matter of time. 
• The Arctic Region is not subject to any military actions or arms control 
mechanism. This is one of the major challenges for the region, and the 
settlement of this issue may have direct consequences for the security of 
the Baltic States. 
                                                   
1 The Arctic Ocean is comprised of the Baffin Bay, Beaufort Sea, Chukchi Sea, East Siberian Sea, 
Greenland Sea, Hudson Bay, Hudson Strait, Kara Sea, Laptev Sea, White Sea and other tributary 
bodies of water. The Arctic Ocean is separated from the Pacific Ocean by the Bering Strait and 
from the Atlantic Ocean – the Greenland Sea and Labrador Sea. - Author’s note. 
2 Data from the “US Geological Survey (USGS) report”.  –  „US  Geological  Survey  (USGS)  
report“. <http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980>. 
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III.1 Boundaries of the Arctic Region3 
 
The temporary “agreement not to agree”: why has the 
settlement of the Arctic dispute proceeded so slowly? 
The most controversial Arctic issues have to do with the territorial claims for the 
Arctic Region that A-5 countries make. It has to be pointed out that the A-5 
states compete not so much for the boundaries of the territorial sectors of each 
state in the Arctic, but rather for the access to natural resources of the Arctic 
continental shelf. 
Despite the intensive competition of A-5 states, at present territorial disputes do 
not hinder development cooperation: 1) Canada and Denmark cooperate by 
carrying out surveys in the Arctic, even though the question of the sovereignty 
over Hans island has not yet been resolved; 2) the US and Canada cooperate by 
                                                   
3 “Arctic Region Reference Map“. 
<http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/islands_oceans_poles/arctic_ref802647_1999.jpg>. 
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exploring the Arctic continental shelf in the Beaufort Sea despite the fact that 
issues on the territorial boundaries in the Beaufort Sea and status of the 
Northwest Passage are of present interest. 3) Canada and Russia share the 
objective to limit international navigation within their territorial waters (this 
issue is being discussed at bilateral negotiations) regardless of the fact that for 
the past two years Canada either has not approved or blocked all Russia’s 
initiatives in the NATO-Russia Council (one of the pretexts being Russia’s 
aggressive development plans in the Arctic4); 4) Russia, Denmark and Canada 
are considering the possibility to submit a joint application on the distribution 
of the Arctic continental shelf5
 
 to the UN Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf. 
Table 1. Territorial claims of A-5 states in the Arctic  
 
Dispute parties Disputed Procedure for question resolution 
Canada and USA Territorial 
border in the 
Beaufort Sea 
Canada substantiates its position by 
maintaining that  the boundaryhas to be 
parallel to the land border. Meanwhile the 
US claims the maritime boundary to follow 
a line of equidistance from the coasts.  The 
disputed territory is likely to be rich in 
hydrocarbon (oil and natural gas) 
reserves.6
Norway and 
Russia 
 
Territorial  
boundaries in 
the Barents 
Sea 
Moscow seeks to divide the Barents Sea 
into sectors, while Norway (claiming a 
number of sea sectors) does not accept 
Russia’s position and seeks to define the 
disputed boundaries by the geographic 
middle line.  Norway substantiates its 
claims by the fact that it has sovereignty 
over Bear Island in the Svalbard 
Archipelago, the shelf of which stores the 
world’s largest natural gas reserves that are 
yet to be developed.7
                                                   
4 Pravda.ru, „Canada Stabs Russia in the Back“. <
 
http://english.pravda.ru/world/americas/02-
12-2009/110902-canada-0>. 
5 Edmonton Journal, „Mapping out Arctic sovereignty“. 
<http://www.canada.com/edmontonjournal/news/story.html?id=1afa8be7-2055-49fc-ad7e- 
be54649e8737&k=19098>. 
6 Walter B. Parker, John Harlow Byrne, „Sea Changes“. 
<http://www.institutenorth.org/servlet/download?id=35>. 
7 BarentsObserver.com, „Time for a Norwegian-Russian settlement”. 
<http://barentsobserver.custompublish.com/index.php?id=4556833>. 
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Canada and the 
US 
The 
Northwest 
Passage 
Canada makes claims to the Northwest 
Passage – a sea route connecting Canadian 
Arctic islands. This is the shortest northern 
route from Europe to Asia. Canada deems 
this route to belong to its internal waters, 
whereas the US as well as other countries 
argues that the Northwestern Sea Route is 
an international strait, since at its 
narrowest section its width exceeds 12 
nautical miles (Canadian territorial waters 
boundary)8
Canada and 
Denmark 
(Greenland) 
. 
Ownership of 
Hans Island 
Both countries are disputing sovereignty 
over Hans Island, a small, uninhabited 
territory located in the middle of Kennedy 
Channel (separating Canada’s Ellesmere 
Island from Greenland). Both countries 
make claims to this island, as it may 
become a weighty argument in the 
consideration of further claims to Arctic 
natural resources or access to the 
Northwest Passage9
Russia and the 
US 
. 
Border issues 
in the Bering 
Sea 
Changes are likely in the present-day 
Russia-US maritime boundary that 
extends north through the Bering Sea 
towards the Arctic. 
The border was confirmed by the 1990 
USA/USSR agreement, however has not 
yet been ratified by the Russian State 
Duma.  Although Russia has inherited all 
international agreements signed in the 
times of the Soviet Union, some Russian 
politicians demand that negotiations be 
renewed and the agreement with the USA 
on the maritime boundary be revised.   
 
Considering the strategic significance of territorial ownership, the ability of the 
states to “freeze” the disagreements seems paradoxical. On the other hand, the 
implications for the provisional “agreement not to agree” are particularly 
pragmatic: 
                                                   
8 Carl Ek, „Canada-U.S. relations“. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/96-397.pdf >. 
9 The Canadian Press, “Satellite imagery moves Hans Island boundary: report”. 
<http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2007/07/26/hans-technology.html>. 
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• The assumptions of international law for the “distribution” of 
the Arctic have not yet come into effect. In the geographical sense the 
Arctic is a frozen part of the World Ocean, therefore the most consistent 
and essentially the only regime of international law applied to the Arctic 
is the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Its practical 
application is hampered by the fact that the US remains the only state 
among the A-5 states that has not yet ratified the UNCLOS. If UNCLOS 
came into force, the starting point for the negotiations would rest on the 
present sectors of the Arctic Region tentatively assigned to each of the A-
5 states. If the US ratified UNCLOS, nothing would prevent Russia, 
Canada, the US, Denmark and Norway from initiating an international 
process of “distribution” of the Arctic, that is, from giving legal status to 
their claims to the territorial, energy and military domination in the 
Arctic continental shelf and its extension. In other words, the 
competition for the Arctic will begin as soon as the US has ratified 
UNCLOS, which will precipitate negotiations not only of the A-5 states, 
but also of other international actors, namely efforts of NATO and the EU 
to interfere into the region’s processes. 
• To date the initial positions for the negotiations, i.e., the 
boundaries of territorial claims, have not yet been defined. Of 
all the A-5 states only Russia and Canada acknowledge the present 
regime of sectoral distribution of the Arctic. Neither the US, nor Norway, 
nor Denmark support the division of the Arctic into sectors deeming it 
unfounded and regulations of the present international law. Due to this 
the initial positions of each of the states remain unclear. Russia was one 
of the first countries to submit an application on the enlargement of its 
continental shelf boundaries in the Arctic (as early as in 2001) to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf of the United Nations 
organization (which is the main institution determining the grounds for 
territorial claims). In 2002 the UN Commission turned down Russia’s 
claims.  Russia made arrangements to submit another application in 
201010
• A necessity to make sure that only A-5 states take part in 
. However, it is possible to forecast that until 2013 Russia will not 
make any active steps in pursuit of justification of the boundaries of its 
sector of the Arctic continental shelf till Denmark and Canada have made 
their decisions on the issue. Meanwhile the latter intend to submit their 
applications to the UN Continental Shelf Commission regarding Arctic 
shelf boundaries in 2012 and 2013 respectively. 
                                                   
10 The more weighty arguments to be presented were the data collected during the Russian 
Arctic expedition (exploring the seabed of the Arctic Ocean), which was carried out in August 
2007. On the basis of these data, Russia was making claims to another 1.2 mln km2 of the ocean 
floor. Russia argues that the northern part of the Arctic Region and the North Pole are connected 
via the underwater Lomonosov Ridge, regarded by Russia as an extension of its continental 
shelf. The Lomonosov Ridge (which stretches across the floor of the Arctic Oceran to connect 
Russia and Greenland) is also claimed by Denmark and Canada, which both state that the Ridge 
is an extension of their continental shelf. – Carolyn Gramling, „Cold wars: Russia claims Arctic 
land“. <http://www.agiweb.org/geotimes//aug07/article.html?id=WebExtra080107.html >. 
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the“competition for the Arctic”. According to the regulations of 
the 1982 UNCLOS Convention, Coastal States (hence the A-5 states) 
exercise sovereign rights over the continental shelf, seeking to explore 
and exploit its natural resources within 200 nautical miles (370 km) 
from the coastline to the outer limit of the territorial sea. 
It is obvious that, in their pursuit to initialise territorial “distribution” of the 
Arctic beyond the boundaries of the continental shelf, the A-5 states primarily 
seek to give legal status to their territorial claims to the Arctic thus eliminating 
the possibility for any other third parties to make any changes. 
The first step toward the enhancement of this status quo was made on May 29, 
2008, when at the Conference on the Arctic Ocean which took place in 
Greenland, the US, Russia, Canada, Denmark and Norway passed the Ilulissat 
Declaration, in which they: 
- emphasized the changes that were taking place in the Arctic and were 
related to the global climate changes; 
- confirmed their obligations to resolve disputed territorial issues in 
accordance with the enforced international agreements (including 
UNCLOS); 
- declined the necessity for a new international legal regime in the 
Arctic Ocean; 
- assumed the obligation to ensure environmental protection of the Arctic 
at the national and intergovernmental (A-5) level and to enhance navigation 
security; 
- expressed their interest in fostering scholarly cooperation and promoting 
scientific information exchange.11
The Ilulissat Declaration emphasized not only the wish of the A-5 states to 
come to an agreement regarding the resolution of their internal problems in 
the Arctic, but also the efforts these states took seeking to limit the activities of 
third parties in the Arctic: 1) by means of this Declaration the A-5 states 
demonstrated their exceptional status resolving issues pertaining to the 
territorial distribution of the Arctic, natural resources, navigational routes and 
so on; 2) having passed this Declaration, the A-5 states essentially blocked the 
way to the development of any other new legal regime (for example, by analogy 
with the Antarctic). 
 
The aforementioned implications provide an explanation to the relatively low 
pressure in the resolution of the Arctic-related questions: the A-5 states are 
unanimous in their goal to ensure that the list of actors of the Arctic policy do 
not extend as well as in their expectation till the “rules of the game” have been 
                                                   
11 Brooks  B.  Yeager,  „The  Ilulissat  Declaration:  Background  and  Implications  for  Arctic 
Governance“. 
<http://www.arcticgovernance.org/getfile.php/991607.1529.vwurfpecxs/Ilulissat+Declaration
+Implications+ver2+fr+CFM+12+05+08.pdf>. 
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defined. On the other hand, the question whether such internal agreement will 
survive the already ongoing “competition for the Arctic” remains open. 
 
Russia’s strategy for the Arctic and strategy 
consequences of “opening” the Arctic 
The role of the Arctic in Russia’s foreign policy and nature of Russia’s 
competition with other A-5 states may have direct consequences for the Baltic 
States. Russia’s strategy selection in the competition for the Arctic will 
determine what function the Baltic States will perform: whether they will be 
observers, buyers of energy resources, or an object of geopolitical exchanges. 
On September 17th, 2008, the Security Council of Russian Federation adopted 
the new Arctic Strategy12
 
 (“Fundamentals of the State Policy in the Arctic for the 
Period Before 2020 and a Longer Perspective”) which emphasized the 
significance of the Arctic as the main source of Russia’s income (from the 
extraction and navigation of energy resources). What is documented is Russia’s 
goal to turn the Arctic into Russia’s major strategic base of natural resources 
before 2020 as well as to maintain its status as the main state in the Arctic. The 
practical implementation of Russia’s strategy in the Arctic is divided into three 
periods. These periods could also be considered as indicators of Russia’s degree 
of activity in the Arctic policy: 
• First Stage (2008-2010): Russia’s preparation for the legitimization of 
the external boundaries of its sector in the Arctic (carrying out geological, 
cartographic research, etc.); development of opportunities for 
international cooperation (in pursuit of effective absorption of Arctic 
natural resources in the Russian sector); implementation of 
miscellaneous projects based on state-private partnership with the 
objective of promoting the development of energy as well as other 
economy spheres in Russia’s Arctic sector; 
 
• Second Stage (2011-2015): Legitimization at the international level of the 
external boundaries of Russia’s sector in the Arctic and implementation 
of Russia’s competitive advantage in the sphere of resource extraction 
and transportation. During this period it is expected to begin the process 
of restructuring the economy of the Arctic sector in order to accelerate 
the absorption of Arctic mineral raw materials as well as ocean biological 
resources and the development of the infrastructure of the Northern Sea 
Route. 
 
                                                   
12 “ Fundamentals of the State Policy in the Arctic for the Period Before 2020 and a Longer 
Perspective”  („Основы государственной политики Российской Федерации в Арктике на 
период до 2020 года и дальнейшую перспективу“). 
<http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html>. 
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• Third Stage (2016-2020): During this period the transformation of 
Russia’s sector in the Arctic into the main natural resource base of 
strategic importance has to be implemented. 
 
In fact, in Russia’s strategic documents the declared active expansion of Russia 
in the Arctic in the short- and mid-term perspective coincides with the 
“opening” perspectives of the Arctic. According to US experts, there is likelihood 
that from 2013 onwards during the summer season (after melting of massive ice 
sheets) the Arctic Ocean will become partly accessible (meanwhile, other 
forecasts maintain that the total seasonal “warming” of the Arctic Ocean may be 
expected from 2030 onwards13). The seasonal “warmings” of the Arctic would 
allow the countries to begin the exploitation of energy resources and would 
dramatically decrease the navigation routes14
Alongside the objective to turn the Arctic into a strategic minerals extraction 
base, in its strategic documents Russia tends to propagate rather actively the 
possibility of resorting to the military force in the Arctic. The latter statement is 
enhanced in Russia’s strategy in the Arctic as well as in the 2009 new strategy 
for Russia’s national security
. Nevertheless, shortened sea 
routes as well as the accessibility of Arctic natural resources would bring real 
benefit not earlier than 2025, while the technologies that will enable effective 
absorption of Arctic resources will only be developed around 2050. Given this, 
Russia and other states view Arctic resources solely as a long-term reserve. 
15
                                                   
13 Sarah Clarke, „Climate changing faster than expected: scientists”. 
<
. In the latter strategy the Arctic is for the first 
time directly related to Russia’s defense of national interests. In Russia’s Arctic 
strategy it is foreseen to dislocate special military forces (“Arctic forces group”), 
which would ensure the control of Russia’s sector in the Arctic  and would be 
answerable to the Security Service of the Russian Federation. The fact that the 
“arming” strategy of the Arctic will be coordinated directly by the FSS reveals 
that Moscow takes this question seriously, while the aforementioned national 
interests, the enhancement of which will be facilitated by Arctic natural 
resources, have to do not so much with the modernization of the economy, but 
rather with the consolidation and financing of Russia’s political and economic 
power. 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/11/25/2752579.htm>. 
14 Northern Sea Route passing along the Russian north coast and joining the North Atlantic with 
the North of the Pacific Ocean would shorten navigation routes by 5000 nautical miles (in 
comparison to the Suez Canal). Canadian Northwest Passage, which connects Asia and Europe, 
would shorten navigation routes by 4000 nautical miles (in comparison with the Panama 
Canal). 
15 ”National Security Strategy of Russian Federation for the period through 2020” (“Стратегия 
национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года“), 
<http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html >. 
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End of Cold War – Competition for Arming the Arctic? 
The Arctic issue is complicated by the fact that mechanisms16 regulating 
international security are only partly applicable to the Arctic or are not 
applicable at all. On the other hand, due to the geographic position and climate 
of the Arctic, only particularly mobile military (naval and air) forces may be 
used in the region. Given this, traditional arms control mechanisms become 
virtually impossible. In a situation where today’s regimes for armament 
restraint are neither applied nor appropriate, the decision of any of the A-5 
states to dislocate military forces in the Arctic Region may have a destabilizing 
effect. Western experts have already paid attention to the grave possibility for 
the Arctic to become another “hot spot”. On September 1, 2009, in its 
intelligence risk assessment, the Danish Defense Intelligence Service released 
forecasts regarding the future of the Arctic Region pointing out that access to 
the Arctic natural resources and shipping routes alongside the growing demand 
for oil in the medium to long-term perspective may result in a diplomatic crisis 
among the A-5 states, which nevertheless should not grow into military 
conflicts17
US experts leave open the possibility that opening of the Arctic may prompt 
confrontation among the states or short-term armed conflicts of low intensity; 
however, the competition for the Arctic should not develop into a large scale 
conflict: 1) although the Arctic Region is of strategic importance to all A-5 
states (for instance, Russia’s territories in the Arctic located beyond the 
Northern polar circle constitute 15-20 % of Russia’s GDP), all A-5 states have 
major seaports in other oceans, due to which the blockade of seaports of the 
Arctic basin is of no vital importance to any of these states; 2) all A-5 states 
share the aspiration to restrict and control the activities of third parties in the 
Arctic as well as the dependence on the cooperation between high-tech 
companies and national governments in the absorption of Arctic resources
. 
18
Although chances are meager for a military conflict in the Arctic, to build up a 
favourable environment for commerce and resource extraction the A-5 states 
have to agree on mutual confidence mechanisms (including in the case of 
military issues). 
; 
3) neither of the A-5 states is keen to maintain tension in the Arctic, as it 
would hinder commercial opportunities in the region. 
                                                   
16 For example, the mechanism encouraging security and mutual confidence of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or flank requirements of the 
adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces (A-CFE). 
17 Mia Bennet, „Danish Defense Intelligence Agency Warns of Diplomatic Riffs“. 
<http://arctic.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/09/04/danish-defense-intelligence-agency-warns- 
of-diplomatic-riffs/>. 
18 National Intelligence Council, „Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World“. 
<http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf>. 
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Arctic institutional challenges for the international politics 
One of the major Arctic-related problems is the lack of institutional regulation: 
although interested countries are members of various organizations, there is no 
institutional /international law regime that would be applicable to all Arctic 
territories and which would be able to establish “the rules of the game” in 
sensitive sectors (viz., “tough” security and commercial activities). All A-5 states 
sharing a border with the Arctic are members of OSCE and the Arctic Council19
at present the Northwestern region of the Pacific situated eastwards from 
Russia and connecting with the Arctic is not subject to any institutional 
mechanisms that would help resolve the problematic Northern transit routes 
issues. What prevents Asian countries and Russia from establishing an 
institution like the BEAC, is the still-prevalent territorial disputes with Japan, 
i.e. issues which are not raised in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. To 
generalize, one may distinguish three main institutional challenges Arctic-
related issue: 
. 
In addition, all Member-states of the Arctic Council belong to the Council of 
Europe (the USA and Canada take part as observer states) and to the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC). Canada, Russia and USA participate in the G-8 
group, which frequently has on its agenda issues that do not fall under the 
competence of other institutions. Of eight Member-States of the Arctic Council 
three are members of the EU, five are members of the European Economic 
Area, and five are NATO members. In this network of overlapping institutions is 
only one gap: 
• The most consistent and so far the only international law instrument in 
the Arctic is the aforementioned United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS), the provisions of which allow the countries to 
resolve many disputed issues related to the territorial jurisdiction, 
extraction of natural resources, navigation, environmental protection 
assurance, and so on. However, with the US non-ratification of this 
convention ways to oblige the A-5 states to observe the UNO decisions 
regarding the disputed Arctic territories remain unclear. Although both 
the former and present US administration support the ratification of the 
UNCLOS, part of Republicans and Democrats in the US Congress oppose 
ratification of this international agreement arguing that the UNCLOS  
violates US rights: 1) UNCLOS  ratification will affect US companies 
involved in deep-sea mining which will be obliged to share these 
resources with companies of other countries; 2) UNCLOS restrictions on 
the freedom of US activities in international waters are unfounded. Due 
to the fact that the UNO (besides the UNCLOS) does not have any 
specific institutions or instruments handling the specific issues of the 
                                                   
19 The Arctic Council was established in 1996 by the agreement of eight states bordering the 
Arctic Region (the US, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Russia).  The 
Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum that seeks to develop cooperation 
between the Arctic Region states and local Arctic communities as well as activities coordination 
on various Arctic-related issues. – Author’s note. 
 www.eesc.lt     12 
Arctic, the region essentially remains a “vacuum” of a united 
institutional/legal regime20
 
. 
• Institutions involved in tackling the Arctic issue (both the Arctic Council 
and the BEAC) are “mild” institutions in their nature as their decisions 
most often are permissive rather than mandatory and thus do not reflect 
the true state of affairs in the Arctic: the decisions of these institutions do 
not cover the “tough” (military) security agenda, nor development of 
economic trends in the Arctic21
 
. 
• Lacking any regulation, Arctic military security and economic issues 
crank up tensions between interested international actors (states and 
organizations): any unilateral attempt to resolve these problems may be 
viewed as illegitimate and stir up opposition22
The effect of the “tough” Arctic security issue on Russia 
. 
The vacuum of security cooperation in the Arctic will inevitably have to be filled. 
Sooner or later the interested parties will be forced to take the initiative and 
enhance measures of mutual trust. The success of this initiative will depend on 
the international weight of the initiator and the support of the A-5 states. As 
long as the A-5 states lack mutual trust, the initiative from the outside is a 
highly probable outcome. With respect to that Russia’s main problem lies in the 
fact that, given this situation, Russia would not be able to control the security 
and military cooperation initiatives in the Arctic. 
The Arctic and NATO-Russia relations. A weighty NATO role in the security 
regulation in the Arctic seems justified as four out of the A-5 states (the US, 
Canada, Denmark, and Norway) are NATO members. In March 2008 the 
European Commission announced the report “Climate Change and 
International Security”23 in which it warned the EU members of the potential 
conflicts in the Arctic. On the basis of this document Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 
then NATO Secretary General, stated that, seeking to defuse potential tensions 
between the states competing in the Arctic, the Alliance would have to expand 
the participation of military contingents in the Arctic Region24
                                                   
20 Alyson J.K. Bailes, „Options for Closer Cooperation in the High North: What is Needed?“. 
<
.  This position 
http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/fp_07.pdf>. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 EurActiv.com, „Solana to sound alarm over coming climate conflicts“. 
<http://www.euractiv.com/en/climate-change/solana-ound-alarm-coming-climate-
conflicts/article-170880>. 
24 Mail Online, „Nato to have military presence in the Arctic as melting ice leads to scramble for 
energy reserves”. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1131848/Nato-
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was voiced again on October 1, 2009, by new NATO Secretary General Anders 
Fogh Rasmusen25
 
. The foregrounding of the Arctic issue in NATO agenda would 
testify to the unanimous position of the US, Canada, Denmark and Norway on 
defense issues of the Arctic territories and expansion of Alliance’s activities in 
the Arctic Region, which is seen as strategically sensitive to Russia.  
NATO may also become a mechanism for an indirect military cooperation in the 
Arctic. For example, the development of military cooperation in the Arctic is of 
particular interest to Northern countries26, which at the Northern countries 
Foreign Ministers’ meeting on June 8-9, 2009 in Reykjavik (Iceland) 
announced their plans to further their military cooperation.  The impetus for 
the expansion of military cooperation of the Northern countries was voiced by 
then Norway Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg in a report announced on 
February 9, 2009 and devoted to cooperation of the Northern countries in the 
spheres of foreign policy and security27
 
. 
The report provided a review the demand for cooperation in the light of global 
and regional security (including the Arctic). On the basis of this report 
Denmark, Iceland, Norway (all NATO members) as well as the neutral Sweden 
and Finland announced their intention to develop a military block that would 
ensure security of the relevant Arctic territories. The objectives of the block are 
to ensure security of the Icelandic airspace, to establish special patrol units, 
quick reaction forces and a common satellite-based surveillance system in the 
region. A more specific draft on Nordic military cooperation is expected to 
appear before the next meeting of Nordic foreign ministers in 2011. 
 
The plans of Nordic countries to enhance joint military cooperation may be 
assessed in two ways. First, in their negotiations on Russia-related bilateral 
issues (Russian wood export duties, energy, etc.), Nordic countries obtain 
certain levers. Second, with Nordic countries strengthening common military 
forces, infrastructural and functional overlaps of their military forces with 
NATO forces as well as joint operations (for example, airspace surveillance, 
rescue operations and so on), Finland and Sweden may be encouraged to 
integrate in the Alliance’s processes in the long run. But even if the latter did not 
seek integration into NATO, such security regime already means an indirect 
presence of NATO in the region. This is why the development of cooperation of 
                                                                                                                                                     
military-presence-Arctic-melting-ice-leads-scramble-energy-eserves.html#ixzz0djTZ64ws>. 
25 Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on emerging security risks. 
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_57785.htm>. 
26 Denmark and Norway have corresponding Arctic sectors, Iceland does not have its own 
military forces, Sweden and Finland parlt belong to the Arctic Region, however, do not have 
direct access to the Arctic continental shelf and are not NATO members. 
27 Thorvald  Stoltenberg,  „Nordic  Cooperation  on  Foreign  and  Security  Policy:   Proposals 
presented to the extraordinary meeting of Nordic foreign ministres in Oslo on 9  February“. 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/nordicreport.pdf >. 
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Nordic countries in the Arctic essentially means the “zero outcome” game to 
Russia’s disadvantage. If the aforementioned initiatives are to be implemented, 
the region’s security issues will turn into a lever in NATO’s hands that will 
enable fortification of the position in relations with Russia. 
The Arctic and EU-Russia relations 
Russia’s analysts emphasize that, seeking to counterbalance the expansion into 
the Arctic of NATO’s potential “tough” (military) force as well as the ambitions 
of other countries, Russia would have to consider the involvement of the EU in 
the resolution of the Arctic issues. In what form could this EU-Russia 
cooperation proceed? Russia’s foreign policy experts believe that the most 
beneficial scenario for Russia would be the renewal of the Northern Dimension. 
So far the EU does not have a consistent strategy in the Arctic, while to date the 
Northern Dimension format is the only EU instrument that at least in formal 
terms covers the Arctic Region. In 1997 the EU initiated the Northern 
Dimension policy which determined a cooperation framework for Northern 
European countries in the spheres of welfare and sustainable development; 
however, the Arctic Region was was not included until 2006. In 2006 the 
Northern Dimension policy was reviewed: it upheld equal rights in the 
partnership involving the EU, Norway, Russia and Iceland, and its geographic 
borders were extended to embrace the Barents Region. The Arctic and Sub-
Arctic Regions, the Baltic Sea and the Kaliningrad Oblast of Russian Federation 
would have to become priority areas; however, in practice the Arctic remained 
EU’s peripheral political sphere.  
Russia’s initiative for cooperation on Arctic issues would provide an opportunity 
for revitalization of the Northern Dimension direction. Ideally, it would allow 
the EU to contribute making relevant decisions and forming the Arctic energy 
policy28
How would Russia benefit from this situation? EU involvement in the resolution 
of the Arctic issues would balance NATO’s role thus substituting the “tough” 
security agenda for “mild” questions, and ever more bureaucratize and “wash 
out” (“to forumize”) the existent institutional ties in the Arctic. On the other 
hand, such decision would enable Russia to build relations with the EU in a 
different fashion and to a certain extent to redraft the map of interest zones. 
. 
                                                   
28 Adele Airoldi, „The European Union and the Arctic: policies and actions“. 
<http://www.norden.org/en/publications/publications/2008-
729/at_download/publicationfile>. 
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Consolidation of the “Northern vector” in Russia’s foreign 
policy and interests of the Baltic States 
The Arctic policy is important to the Baltic States due to the fact that in the EU-
Russia relations the Arctic range of problems may offer additional dividends 
dealing not only with the resolution of the Arctic issue, but also with Russia-EU 
relations, notably, Russia’s interests in the Baltic Sea Region. If Russia 
succeeded in foregrounding the Arctic issue in the Northern Dimension policy, 
this would give rise to an opportunity to combine three Russia’s foreign policy 
agendas: 1) Russia’s relations with the Baltic States; 2) Russia’s relations with 
the Nordic countries; 3) Russia’s energy resources and commercial 
opportunities in the Arctic.  
 
Joining of the three agenda would be particularly disadvantageous to the Baltic 
States, as the Baltic Sea Region might become a “hostage” of the Arctic Region. 
It should be taken into consideration that, despite the renewed EU “Northern 
Dimension” policy of 2006, Russia’s bonds are meager due to the poor 
interaction between the EU and NATO. This equips Russia with the possibility 
to implement a “multivectoral” foreign policy through the formation of unions 
with individual states on the basis of various interests. Adding the Arctic issue 
to the Northern Dimension would not boost Russia’s international obligations, 
rather, the contrary is more likely: the content of the Baltic Sea Region policy 
would depend on the success of Arctic-related negotiations of the large 
countries. All this could provide premises for distinctive political “exchanges”: 
Russia’s obligations in the Arctic and provision of energy resources to Europe in 
exchange for discounts to Russia in the Baltic Sea Region. 
• One of the most relevant issues to the security of the Baltic States is the 
extent to which the EU will seek to participate in the resolution of the 
“tough” security in the Arctic issues. If the Northern Dimension acquired 
the “tough” security aspect, Russia would automatically gain more 
influence on the security of the Baltic Sea Region. In exchange for 
armament restrictions Russia could make demands on the security 
infrastructure in the Baltic Sea Region. Another possibility rests on the 
idea that three of the A-5 states, viz. the US, Canada and Norway, are not 
EU members, and based on that Russia could come up with a regional 
security system, alternative to Euro-Atlantic structures (for instance, a 
Baltic States defense union, or European security agreement 
organization). The rise of such phenomena would have negative 
consequences to NATO’s agenda and efficiency as well as the security of 
the Baltic States. 
• An undefined format does not ensure energy security interests of the 
Baltic States. The flexibility of the Northern Dimension policy opens 
vistas for the development of bilateral energy diplomacy, in which the 
obligations of the Northern Dimension have virtually no influence. This 
means that the development of energy infrastructure in the North-West 
or North-South directions will only reflect the interests of those countries 
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which will be ready for direct negotiations with Russia (as, for example, 
the already mentioned “Nord Stream” gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea.). 
The skills of the Baltic States to defend their interests in this situation 
successfully are poor. 
As long as the A-5 “agreement not to agree” is in effect, it is early to speculate on 
specific Arctic policy outcomes for the Baltic States. However, the announced 
positions of the main actors allow one to foresee the outlines of interests of the 
Baltic States in the development of this policy and identify the most favourable 
and most unfavourable scenarios, which could help form a purposeful Baltic 
States policy in an attempt to protect against surprises in the future. 
 
Table 2. Scenarios for Russia and Baltic States interests in 
the Arctic  
 
Changes in 
Arctic policy 
Russia’s interests Interests of the Baltic 
States 
NATO’s 
unified stance 
on security 
and military 
policy issues 
in the Arctic 
NATO’s involvement in 
“tough” security policy in 
the Arctic is unhandy to 
Russia which does not 
have direct influence on 
NATO’s levers. Given this 
situation, in the 
resolution of issues 
related to the military 
status of the Arctic 
Russia would become “an 
invited guest” rather than 
a decision-maker. 
NATO’s involvement in 
ensuring stability in the Arctic 
would be favourable to the 
Baltic States, since the 
security agenda of the Arctic 
would then be kept separate 
from the Baltic States security 
agenda. 
Involvement 
of Nordic 
countries in 
ensuring 
security and 
defense in 
the Arctic 
The involvement of 
Nordic countries causes 
little inconvenience to 
Russia in political terms, 
since the direct 
involvement of NATO 
(which, judging by 
Russia’s national 
security standpoint, is 
analogous to but another 
NATO’s expansion in 
Russia’s space of 
interests. 
Such solution of the problem 
would bring about less 
tension to NATO-Russia 
relations than NATO’s direct 
involvement, while “mild” and 
“tough” security issues in the 
Arctic would be kept separate 
from Russia-EU relations. 
On the other hand, this 
initiative remains a grey area 
until a specific cooperation 
mechanism and Russia’s role 
in this mechanism have been 
agreed upon. 
Involvement of EU involvement would 
allow Russia to 
EU-Russia cooperation is 
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the EU in the 
resolution of 
the issues of 
the Arctic 
Region. 
counterbalance to a 
certain degree or to 
change the potential 
NATO involvement in 
the Arctic policy as well 
as the role of other A-5 
states. For Russia this 
would imply a not too 
binding cooperation in 
the sphere of “tough” 
security and 
investments needed for 
the absorption of the 
resources. 
favourable to the Baltic States 
on condition that it is kept 
separate from issues dealing 
with the Baltic Sea Region 
and is devoted to solely 
energy and “mild” security 
questions. In the best-case 
scenario, the Arctic issues 
would be incorporated in the 
EU-Russia energy dialogue 
(covering environmental, 
investment, and energy 
supply issues). 
The Arctic 
factor in the 
Northern 
Dimension 
 
It would allow Russia to 
counterbalance the 
influence of NATO and 
the A-5 states, but also 
“cleanse” “tough” and 
“mild” security provisions 
as well as Russia’s 
obligations. Russia would 
gain additional weight by 
resolving the Baltic Sea 
security issues and 
grounds for initiating the 
formation defense 
alliances with a view to 
devaluing the role of 
NATO. Meanwhile the 
dimension of energy 
security would remain 
totally dependent on the 
type and possibilities of 
agreements between 
individual EU Member-
states and Russia. 
This scenario is particularly 
unfavourable to the Baltic 
States. Should the Baltic Sea 
issues be coupled with the 
Arctic issues, interests of the 
Baltic States might become 
the exchange object between 
the EU and Russia. 
Meanwhile, as energy 
security issues are becoming 
less definite, the likelihood of 
the development of projects 
analogous to “Nord Stream” 
is increasing, i.e., projects 
which do not improve the 
state of energy security of the 
Baltic States, but cause 
ecological damage and make 
energy isolation probable. 
 
